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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
PlaintiffZAppellee : 
v. : 
REBECCA CHAMPNEYS : Case No. 20020123-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for attempted tampering with 
evidence, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated sections 76-8-510 
and 76-4-101 (1999), and attempted forgery, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated sections 76-6-501 and 76-4-101 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction 
over this appeal under Utah Code Annotated section 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 2001), which 
grants this Court jurisdiction over cases not involving a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. Did the police have probable cause of a crime based on an informant's tip 
without conducting any meaningful, independent investigation to corroborate the reported 
criminal activity? In reviewing whether the police had cause probable cause of criminal 
activity, this Court overturns factual findings for clear error and reviews the trial court's 
legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 332, [^8, 37 P.3d 
260. Trial counsel specifically argued below that the police lacked probable cause. R. 
34-37; 116: 19-23.1 
2. Did exigent circumstances justify the police in conducting a warrantless search 
of a motel room based on two women's tidying up and scurrying after the police knocked 
on their motel room door? In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court 
reviews factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions for correctness. Valenzuela. 
2001 UT App 332, ^ [8, 37 P.3d 260. Trial counsel contested the exigency of the situation 
in a motion to suppress and at a subsequent hearing. R. 34-37; 116: 19-23.2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects persons from 
unreasonable searches and seizures: 
!The volume marked 116 contains the transcript of the hearing on the motion to 
suppress. Volume 117 contains the plea hearing transcript. The internal page numbers of 
those volumes are included after" R.:" and the volume number. 
2These same issues arise in a co-defendant's case which is pending before this 
Court in State v. Corwell, No. 20020343-CA. Because both appeals raise identical issues, 
and no conflict of interest exists between these cases, appellate counsel represents both 
Ms. Champneys and Ms. Corwell on appeal. Appellate counsel has not sought to 
consolidate these appeals, however, because a motion to withdraw Ms. Cornell's guilty 
plea remains pending in the trial court. Appellate counsel has requested this Court to stay 
Ms. Corwell's appeal pending the outcome of her motion. 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
Article I, section XIV of the Utah Constitution provides similar protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 4, 2001, the State filed an Information charging Appellant Rebecca 
Champneys with one count each of tampering with evidence, unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 2. Ms. 
Champneys filed a motion to suppress the evidence that the police obtained from her 
during a warrantless search of her motel room. R. 34. The State opposed the motion. R. 
26. After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. R. 91; 116: 24-26. The 
trial court also consolidated this case with a forgery charge that the State had filed against 
Ms. Champneys in case number 011918743. R. 116: 27; 117: 13. 
On December 7, 2001, Ms. Champneys agreed to plead guilty to one count each of 
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attempt to tamper with evidence and attempted forgery. R. 81. In exchange for the pleas, 
the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to allow Ms. Champneys to 
challenge the denial of her motion to suppress on appeal. R. 81; 117: 2-4. The trial court 
accepted the guilty pleas the same day. R. 117: 13-14. 
On February 1, 2002, the trial court sentenced Ms. Champneys to a term of up to 
five years imprisonment but suspended that term and placed her on probation for 24 
months. R. 95-96; Addendum. The judge also ordered the sentence to run concurrently 
with the sentence for the attempted forgery charge. R. 95. In addition, the trial judge 
imposed a fine but suspended part of it, ordered Ms. Chamnpeys to pay $350 toward the 
cost of her court-appointed attorney, enrolled her in a drug treatment program, and 
ordered her to perform 75 hours of community service. R. 96-97. Ms. Champneys filed a 
timely notice of appeal on February 13, 2002. R. 98. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 13, 2000, a caller telephoned Salt Lake City police dispatch and stated 
that a woman named Liza Crowell was with another woman in room 236 at a motel 
located at 1990 West and North Temple Street. R. 40, 47; 116: 3. The caller claimed that 
the two women were either using or selling drugs in the room. R. 47-48. The police 
dispatched several officers to the motel including Detectives Troy Anderson and Tracy 
Ita. R. 40; 116:3. 
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The record indicates that the police did not know the identity of the caller when 
they went to the motel. Although the caller appears to have been Liza's husband, the 
record does not indicate when the police learned this information. Detective Anderson 
testified at the preliminary hearing that dispatch had informed him that Liza's husband 
had made the call. R. 48. But, at the suppression hearing, three months later, he insisted 
three times that he could not remember the dispatch report including the caller's identity 
when he responded to the motel. R. 116:3,9, 13. Based on the lack of evidence, the trial 
court found that the filler was "anonymous." R. 116: 24. 
Detectives Anderson and Ita went to the motel room to perform strictly a "knock 
and talk." R. 40. A knock and talk involves the police approaching a residence without a 
warrant to see if the occupants are willing to cooperate with the police. R. 49. Both 
detectives were in plain clothes. R. 116: 11. 
Detective Ita knocked on the door of room 236 and Ms. Champneys inquired, from 
behind the door, who was knocking. R. 40. Detective Ita responded, "Tracy." R. 40. 
Ms. Champneys asked again who had knocked on the door. R. 40. Detective Ita 
identified himself as "Tracy" and added that he was a police detective. R. 40. Ms. 
Champneys demanded to see a police badge which Detective Ita presented through the 
peep hole and Detective Anderson presented through the window leading into the room. 
R. 41; 116: 4. Detective Anderson testified that there was a gap between the window 
curtains where he could show his badge and see into the room. R. 50. 
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As Detective Anderson looked through the window, he informed Ms. Champneys 
that the police were looking for a woman named Liza. R. 41. Ms. Champneys stated 
through the closed door that she was alone in the room. R. 41. At that point, Detective 
Anderson looked through the window and saw another woman in the room putting a 
"metallic" object into a purse. R. 41, 49; 116: 6, 12. Det. Anderson stated that he 
"thought" the object was the "right shape and size of a crack pipe." R. 41, 49; 116: 6, 12. 
Ms. Champneys then acknowledged that the other woman in the room was Liza Corwell. 
R. 116:5. 
When Detective Anderson informed Detective James Tracy what he had observed, 
Detective Tracy went to the motel manager's office for a key to the room. R. 42. While 
Detective Tracy retrieved the key, Detective Anderson continued to talk to Ms. 
Champneys and asked her to open the door. R. 42. Ms. Champneys refused, however, to 
allow the police to enter. R. 42. Detective Anderson then observed the two women 
hiding things under and behind the bed, including the purse that contained the metal 
object. R. 42. The women also went in and out of the bathroom two to four times each. 
R. 42: 116: 4, 7. In Detective Anderson's experience, criminal suspects are known to 
flush drugs down a toilet or sink, especially, in motel rooms, to avoid detection. R. 116: 
7. 
Detective Tracy returned with the room key and opened the door. R. 42. The door 
only opened a few inches because it was secured from the inside by a security latch. R. 
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42; 116: 8. The police again demanded that Ms. Champneys unlocked the door but she 
refused. R. 42. When Det. Tracy kicked at the door, Ms. Champneys offered to open the 
door halfway. R. 42. Without responding to this offer, Detective James Tracy kicked the 
door completely open and the detectives entered the room. R. 42. 
Detective Anderson immediately placed Ms. Champneys in a twist lock and 
secured plastic flex cuffs on her wrists while the other detectives restrained Ms. Corwell. 
R. 43. He searched Ms. Champneys' pockets and found a crack pipe. R. 43. Ms. 
Champneys admitted that she used the pipe for smoking cocaine. R. 43. She then 
become hostile and demanded that a female detective continue the search. R. 43. 
Detective Anderson learned that a female detective was en route and waited for her 
arrival. R. 43. 
Officer Patty Roberts arrived shortly thereafter and searched both women, 
separately in the bathroom. R. 44. Officer Roberts found a twist of cocaine in Ms. 
Champneys bra and also found other items associated with drug usage. R. 44. As she 
located this evidence, Officer Roberts placed it on the bathroom counter. R. 45. A 
struggle then ensued between Officer Roberts and Ms. Champneys during which Ms. 
Champneys claimed that the cocaine twist had fallen down the sink drain. R. 45-46. 
Nevertheless, Officer Roberts found the cocaine in Ms. Champneys' hand. R. 46. 
During the search of Ms. Corwell, Officer Roberts found a baggie of cocaine in her 
bra as well. R. 52-53. The police also searched the purse in which Ms. Corwell had 
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stuffed the metal object and found a spoon with cocaine residue on it but no pipe. R. 116: 
12. Detective Anderson admitted that during his observations through the window he 
never saw the women possessing any drugs, he smelled nothing, and he heard no water 
running, including the flushing of toilets. R. 116: 7, 12. 
The State charged Ms. Champneys with one count each of tampering with 
evidence, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia. R. 2. Ms. Champneys filed a motion to suppress the evidence the police 
obtained from the warrantless search of her motel room. R. 34. The State opposed the 
motion. R. 26. The trial court denied the motion and consolidated this case with a 
forgery charge that the State had filed against Ms. Champneys in case number 
011918743. R. 91; 116:24-26. 
On December 7, 2001, Ms. Champneys agreed to plead guilty to one count each of 
attempt to tamper with evidence and attempted forgery. R. 81. In exchange for the pleas, 
the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to allow Ms. Champneys to 
challenge the denial of her motion to suppress on appeal. R. 81; 117: 2-4. The trial court 
accepted the guilty pleas the same day. R. 117: 13-14. 
On February 1, 2002, the trial court sentenced Ms. Champneys to a term of up to 
five years imprisonment but suspended that term and placed her on probation for 24 
months. R. 95-96. The judge also ordered the sentence to run concurrently with the 
sentence for the attempted forgery charge. R. 95. In addition, the trial judge imposed a 
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fine but suspended part of it, ordered Ms. Champneys to pay $350 toward the cost of her 
court-appointed attorney, enrolled her in a drug treatment program, and ordered her to 
perform 75 hours of community service. R. 96-97. This appeal followed. R. 98. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The police violated Ms. Champneys' right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures when they forcibly entered her motel room and arrested her without a 
warrant. The police may search a residence without a warrant if they have probable 
cause and if exigent circumstances require immediate police action. But, here, the police 
lacked probable cause to search the room based on an anonymous tip and without 
conducting more than minimal observations. 
Similarly, the police lacked exigent circumstances to enter the motel room. The 
State failed to meet its weighty burden of proving that the women in the room were 
destroying evidence. The police saw no drugs, smelled no odors, or heard any sounds 
that indicated that the women were flushing drugs down the toilet or sink. The absence of 
evidence justifying a warrantless search rendered the search and arrest illegal. 
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ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE THE POLICE LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE 
AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY 
CONDUCTED AN ILLEGAL, WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
AND ARREST 
The warrantless search and arrest of Ms. Champneys' violated her state and federal 
constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. f,[S]earches 
conducted without a warrant 'aieper se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions/" State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (quoting Katz v. United 
States. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasis in original)). The exception at issue here 
required the State to establish "probable cause and exigent circumstances." City of Orem 
v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In finding exceptions to the warrant requirement, "[t]he State bears [a] particularly 
heavy burden" of persuasion. State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
"[Exceptions are 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there must be a 'showing by those 
who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made [the search] 
imperative.'" Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258 (quoting Collidge v. New Hampshire. 403 U.S. 443, 
455 (1971) (plurality opinion) (internal quotations omitted)). Because the police failed to 
sufficiently corroborate the anonymous report of drug activity, they lacked both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances necessary to conduct a warrantless search. 
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A. Without Substantial Corroborating Evidence, 
The Anonymous Tip Failed to Establish 
Probable Cause 
The ambiguous police observations coupled with the failure of the police to 
corroborate the tip failed to support probable cause of a crime. When "the State 
predicates its probable cause argument upon information received from an informant, 
'[this Court] must examine the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether the 
informant's tip, together with police observations, provided probable cause to arrest'" the 
defendant. State v. Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 332,1(11, 37 P.3d 260 (quoting State v. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1996), quoting Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238 
(1983)). "This inquiry involves ca practical, common-sense decision whether, given all 
the circumstances .. ., including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons 
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that. . . evidence of a crime will 
be found.1" Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238)). 
This Court considers three factors in determining whether probable cause supports 
an arrest based on an informant's tip: 
Our first focus is upon "the type of tip or informant involved," 
[Kavsville City v. Mulcahv. 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997)], granting identified informants substantially more 
credibility than anonymous informants. See id Next, we 
examine "whether the informant gave enough detail about the 
observed criminal activity to support a [seizure]," and concluded 
that "[a] tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the informant 
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observed the details personally, instead of relaying information 
from a third party." IdL at 236. Finally, we examine "whether 
the police officer's personal observations confirm the 
dispatcher's report of the informant's tip," noting that an officer 
can corroborate the information" 'either by observing the illegal 
activity[,] or by finding the person, [and the other material facts] 
substantially as described by the informant.' " Id (citation 
omitted). Moreover, while we stated that " '[w]here the 
reliability of the information is increased, less corroboration is 
necessary,'" idL (alteration in original) (citation omitted), we 
also established that absent a risk to public safety we expect 
police officers to make significant independent corroborative 
efforts to confirm the information. See id. 
Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332,1fl5, 37 P.3d 260. 
Considering these factors, the police lacked probable cause of criminal activity. 
First, "'[b]ecause an anonymous caller's basis of knowledge and veracity are typically 
unknown,' anonymous tips are toward 'the low-end of the reliability scale.'" Mulcahv, 
943 P.2d at 235 (quoting State v. Evans. 692 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)). 
At the time the police knocked on Ms. Champneys' motel door, they only knew that an 
anonymous caller claimed that two women were using or selling drugs in the room. See 
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (reasonable suspicion based on police officer's 
knowledge at the time of a search). Absent some '"indicia of reliability,'" an anonymous 
tip fails to provide the police probable cause to search or arrest a person. JJL, 529 U.S. at 
270 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). 
Second, the anonymous caller did not provide much detail or state that he had 
"observed the details personally." Mulcahv. 943 P.2d at 236. In fact, the caller indicated 
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that he lacked personal knowledge of the activities in the motel room. Specifically, he 
claimed that Liza Corwell was with another woman in a motel room and they could be 
either using or selling drugs. The caller's failure to specify what was occurring in the 
room suggests that he had not personally witnessed any drug usage in the room. Thus, it 
appears that the caller lacked first-hand knowledge with the situation. Id. 
Third, the police made little "significant independent corroborative efforts to 
confirm the information." Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332,1fl5, 37 P.3d 260. The police 
admitted that they never attempted to stake out the motel room to determine whether 
anyone was frequenting the room. R. 116: 9. Likewise, the police failed to even contact 
the motel manager before knocking on the door to confirm whether Ms. Corwell had 
rented a room or whether any suspicious activity had occurred there. R. 116: 9-10. In 
fact, the police made no effort to corroborate the tip, at all, before knocking on the door. 
R. 116: 9-10. Rather than verifying the anonymous tip, it appears the police hoped either 
to gain the occupants' consent to enter the room or to just test their luck and knock on the 
door. The fact that the police performed a knock and talk shows that they believed 
themselves that they lacked probable cause to obtain a search warrant. 
Admittedly, the police did confirm that Ms. Corwell was in the room. But, in 
determining the reliability of a tip, the information must "be reliable in its assertion of 
illegal[] [activity], not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person." J.L., 529 
U.S. at 272; see also State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Without 
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confirming the existence of drug activity, the police lacked probable cause. 
The only indication even hinting at drug usage was Det. Anderson's claim that he 
saw Ms. Crowell place a "metallic" object into her purse which he "thought" was the 
"right shape and size of a crack pipe." R. 49; 116: 6, 12. Det. Anderson's observations 
merely amounted to a suspicion of drug activity. Of most importance, Det. Anderson was 
mistaken in his belief that the metal object was a pipe. Moreover, despite his attempts to 
make his description as definite as he could, he was only able to state that he "thought" 
the object was a crack pipe. R. 49, 116: 6, 12. This vague assertion coupled with Det. 
Anderson's inaccurate observations do not constitute "a fair probability that. . . evidence 
of a crime w[ould] be found.1" Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233 (quoting Gates. 462 U.S. at 
238)). 
Likewise, the women's movements after the police announced their presence were 
nothing more than suspicious activity rather than probable cause. Although the women 
were obviously scurrying and tidying up the room, the police saw the women engaging in 
no illegal activity. The police specifically stated that they saw no evidence that the 
women possessed or hid drugs. The police saw nothing in the women's hands, detected 
no smells, and heard no noises indicating that the women were disposing of drugs. 
The police officers' failure to investigate the anonymous tip and their ambiguous 
observations of the women hardly constituted "significant independent corroborative 
efforts to confirm the information." Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 336,1fl5, 37 P.3d 260. In 
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sum, the police may have had a suspicion of criminal activity but they lacked probable 
cause. 
B, The Suspects' Ambiguous Actions Failed to 
Support that They Were Destroying Drugs 
For similar reasons, the State failed to meet its "heavy burden" of establishing 
exigent circumstances to support the warrantless search. Beavers. 859 P.2d at 13. 
"Exigent circumstances are those 'that would cause a reasonable person to believe that 
entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the 
destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence 
improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.'" Id at 18 (quoting United 
States v. McConnev. 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Or.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984)). 
On appeal, this Court must "review the totality of the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case to determine if the finding of exigency was proper." Ashe, 745 P.2d at 
1258. 
Here, the State failed to present sufficient facts supporting an immediate need to 
search the motel room to prevent the destruction of evidence. Det. Anderson conceded 
that although the metal object appeared to be a crack pipe, he saw no other evidence of 
drugs in the room. As noted above, the police saw the women holding nothing suspicious 
in their hands, there was no evidence that drugs were being used in the room, and the 
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police heard no noises that would suggest the destruction of evidence such as the flushing 
of toilets or running water. Rather, the police only had a generalized concern that drug 
offenders are known to destroy evidence to prevent detection. To conduct a warrantless 
search, the police must have "particularized suspicion" as opposed to concerns for or 
knowledge of criminal behavior generally. Illinois v. Wardlow. 528 U.S. 119, 124 
(2000). 
The State failed to meet its weighty burden of showing that the women were 
destroying evidence. The women's tidying up and trips into the bathroom do not 
necessarily suggest that they were destroying evidence. These actions could have been 
wholly innocent such as cleaning the room or putting away personal or intimate items. 
Absent more definite indications that evidence was being destroyed, the police 
violated Ms. Champneys' rights when they forcibly entered her motel room. A person's 
privacy interests in a motel room is on par with one's home. Lanza v. New York 370 
U.S. 139, 143-44 (1962). Accordingly, "'[t]he need for an immediate search must be 
apparent to the police, and so strong as to outweigh the important protection of individual 
rights provided by the warrant requirement.'" Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18 (quoting United 
States v. Robertson, 606 F.2d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 1979)). Given the sacred nature of the 
right to privacy in a dwelling and the ambiguity of the women's actions, the State failed 
to establish that a reasonable person "cwould'" have concluded that the women were, in 
fact, destroying evidence. l± (quoting McConnev. 728 F.2d at 1199). 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the police lacked
 i bable cause and exigent circumstances, Ms. 
Champneys requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of her motion to 
suppress. 
Submitted, this 7*. day of June, 2002. 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
If ED 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REBECCA CHAMPNEYS, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 011905093 FS 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Date: February 1, 2002 
PRESENT 
Clerk: evelynt 
Prosecutor: TAYLOR, LANA 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): FINLAYSON, DAVID V 
DATE 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENT; 
0 * 7 Ob/* I£ 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 17, 1958 
Video 
Tape Number: 2/1/02 Tape Count: 11:02/11:11 
CHARGES 
1. TAMPER WITH EVIDENCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/07/2001 {Guilty Plea} 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAMPER WITH EVIDENCE a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
This sentence runs concurrent with sentence in case #011918743 
Criminal Sentence @J 
JD 
Case No: 011905093 
Date: Feb 01, 2002 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $4250.00 
Surcharge: $637.50 
Due: $1387.50 
Total Fine: $5000.00 
Total Suspended: $4250.00 
Total Surcharge: $637.50 
Total Principal Due: $1387.50 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $350.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SLC, LDA 
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE 
Pay recoupment within the probation period. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 24 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1387.50 where the surcharge has been 
added to the fine. Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Violate no laws. 
Case No: 011905093 
Date: Feb 01, 2002 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Perform community service hours. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Complete 75 hours community service in lieu/of jail. 
Complete an Out-Patient Substance Abuse 
direction of APP. 
Have no contact with the co-defendant. 
Maintain fulltime verifiable employment 
Dated this / day of xrT^jt—" 
atment Program, at the 
^IMOTHY R. HANSON 
^District Court Judge 
